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Chappell v. State, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 83 (Dec. 30, 2021)1
Criminal Law: APPEAL DISMISSING A POSTCONVICTION PETITION FOR A WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS
Summary:
In an opinion drafted by Justice Cadish, the Nevada Supreme Court considered a case in
which several mandatory procedural bars apply to postconviction habeas petitions under NRS
Chapter 34. A petitioner must demonstrate good cause and prejudice in order to overcome the
mandatory procedural bars and avoid dismissal of a postconviction habeas petition. A claim of
good cause must be raised by the petitioner within a reasonable time after it becomes available.
The Court concludes that the ineffective assistance claims lack merit and affirmed the district
court order dismissing Chappell's third postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus as
procedurally barred.
Facts and Procedural History:
Nearly three decades ago, while appellant James Chappell was serving time in a Las
Vegas jail for domestic battery, he was mistakenly released from custody. After being released,
Chappell broke into the home of his ex-girlfriend, molested her, and then stabbed her to death
with a kitchen knife. Chappell was found guilty of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly
weapon, robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, and burglary. The jury sentenced him to death
for the murder, and the Court affirmed the judgment and sentence on direct appeal. 2
Chappell asserted the ineffective assistance of his first postconviction counsel as good
cause and prejudice to raise procedurally barred grounds for relief from the guilt phase of his
trial. But he did not do so until after the penalty phase retrial he obtained in the first
postconviction proceeding, the direct appeal from the judgment entered after the penalty phase
retrial, and the remittitur issued on appeal from the district court order denying his second
postconviction habeas petition
Chappell filed a postconviction appeal for a writ of habeas corpus. While the district
court rejected Chappell’s claims related to the guilt phase, it found that Chappell received
ineffective assistance during the penalty phase and a new penalty hearing was ordered. 3 At the
penalty-phase retrial, the jury returned a death sentence, and the Court affirmed the sentence on
appeal.4
After the penalty-phase retrial, Chappell filed a second postconviction petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, this time challenging the death sentence imposed at the penalty phase retrial.
The district court denied the petition, and the Court affirmed. 5 A third postconviction petition for
a writ of habeas corpus was filed in November of 2016. The district court dismissed the petition
1
2
3
4
5

By Kalin Olson.
Chappell v. State (Chappell I), 114 Nev. 1403, 972 P.2d 838 (1998).
Chappell v. State (Chappell II), Docket No. 43493 (Order of Affirmance, Apr. 7, 2006.
Chappell v. State (Chappell III), No. 49478, 2009 WL 3571279 (Nev. Oct. 20, 2009) (Order of Affirmance).
Chappell v. State (Chappell IV), No. 61967, 2015 WL 3849122 (Nev. June 18, 2015) (Order of Affirmance).

1

as procedurally barred after conducting a limited hearing on one of the claims. The case at hand
is the appeal that followed.
Discussion:
The district court did not err in dismissing the petition as untimely, successive, and an abuse of
the writ
Under NRS 34.726(1) "[A] petition that challenges the validity of a judgment or sentence
must be filed within 1 year after entry of the judgment of conviction or, if an appeal has been
taken from the judgment, within 1 year after the appellate court . . . issues its remittitur."
Chappell filed his third postconviction habeas petition over 17 years after the remittitur issued in
the appeal from the original judgment, and over 6 years after the remittitur issued in the appeal
from the judgment entered after the penalty-phase retrial.
This third petition was subject to multiple, mandatory procedure bars. Many of the
grounds for relief in the petition had been waived by Chappell because he could have raised them
in the previous postconviction petitions, or on direct appeal. Chappell had to demonstrate good
cause and prejudice in order to avoid dismissal based on the procedural bars. Referring to both
his first and second postconviction counsel, Chappell claimed to demonstrate good cause and
prejudice.
Ineffective postconviction counsel can give cause for a successive and untimely petition
where counsel was appointed as a matter of right, but only if the counsel claim is not itself
untimely and thus barred procedurally. A postconviction-counsel claim is raised within a
reasonable time and is not procedurally barred when it is raised within one year of "the
conclusion of the postconviction proceedings in which the ineffective assistance allegedly
occurred."6
Chappell did not timely raise the good-cause claims based on ineffective assistance of first
postconviction counsel
The Court disagreed with Chappell’s claims that the first postconviction counsel's
ineffectiveness provides good cause to raise procedurally barred grounds for relief from the
conviction, and that the third petition provided his first opportunity to pursue the claims. The
remittitur in Chappell’s first postconviction appeal was issued in May of 2006. Chappell had one
year from this date to assert counsel’s ineffectiveness as good cause to raise the challenges to his
conviction but missed that deadline by almost a decade.
Relying on Johnson v. State,7 Chappell first argued that after obtaining relief from the
original death sentence, no judgment of conviction to challenge in a postconviction petition
existed until the new judgment was entered. However, the Court holding in Johnson dealt with a
penalty phase retrial that had been granted on direct appeal, rather than a penalty phase retrial
granted in a postconviction proceeding as was the case here. Johnson distinguished between
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cases where the death sentence was reversed on direct appeal and those where the death sentence
was vacated in a postconviction proceeding. 8
Chappell next argued that if he had filed a petition raising the postconviction-counsel
claims before the penalty phase retrial, appeal, and challenges were complete, there would have
been confusion about whether the petition would be subject to the special rules that apply to
petitions filed by a person who is under a death sentence. The Court disagreed, stating that
requiring a person in Chappell’s position to file a postconviction petition before a penalty phase
retrial and related challenges are complete would not lead to possible confusion.
The Court again disagreed with Chappell’s third argument that he could not raise his
good cause claims sooner because first postconviction counsel continued to represent him in the
penalty phase retrial and no new postconviction counsel was appointed to represent him on a
second postconviction petition. The continued representation of Chappell did not impede his
ability to file a second postconviction petition asserting that the first postconviction counsel's
ineffectiveness provided good cause to raise procedurally barred challenges to the conviction.
Consistent with earlier cases, Chappell’s good cause claims based on first postconviction
counsel’s ineffective performance were available when the remitter issued on appeal from the
district court’s order denying his petition. Because he filed the petition asserting those claims
over a year later, the claims were untimely and could not provide good cause.
Chappell timely raised good-cause claims based on second postconviction counsel's alleged
ineffective assistance
When Chappell raised claims that counsel's ineffectiveness during the second
postconviction proceeding provide good cause to raise procedurally barred grounds for relief, he
did so within one year after they became available. This met the first component of the good
cause showing required under NRS 34.726(1). To satisfy the second component, Chappell also
had to prove that the counsel was ineffective.
Chappell's claims that second postconviction counsel provided ineffective assistance lack merit
To prove that second postconviction counsel was ineffective, Chappell had to show "(1)
that counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced
[him]."9 Conclusory or general assertions of deficient performance are insufficient, and a
petitioner must specifically articulate how counsel’s performance prejudiced the petitioner.
When considering whether Chappell proved that second postconviction counsel provided
ineffective assistance, the Court addressed the merits of the procedurally barred grounds for
relief
Failure to support claims related to evidence of Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders
Chappell argued that penalty phase counsel should have presented evidence of Fetal
Alcohol Spectrum Disorders (FASD) and of Chappell's irreversible brain damage due to prenatal
8
9

Id. at 575, 402 P.3d at 1273.
Rippo, 134 Nev. at 423, 423 P.3d at 1098.

3

exposure to alcohol and drugs. The second postconviction petition included a similar claim that
was rejected on its merits. Chappell argued that second postconviction counsel did not support
the claim with enough evidence, or in a compelling manner. After conducting an evidentiary
hearing on this claim, the district court concluded that penalty phase counsel presented most of
the evidence Chappell hoped to introduce and rejected the postconviction counsel claim.
Chappell failed to demonstrate that he would have been granted relief had the FASD claim been
handled differently by second postconviction counsel.
Failure to raise grounds for relief based on ineffective assistance during jury selection at the
penalty phase retrial
Chappell claimed that second postconviction counsel provided ineffective assistance by
omitting multiple procedurally barred grounds for relief related to jury selection at the penalty
phase retrial. He alleges that penalty phase counsel should have challenged several biased venire
members who ultimately were seated on the jury for the penalty phase retrial, that the trial court
erroneously denied his for-cause challenges of three venire members who did not serve on the
jury during the penalty phase retrial, and that penalty phase counsel did not attempt to
rehabilitate death-scrupled venire members.
Chappell's appellate arguments and pleading are deficient. The appellate arguments rely
on ineffective assistance of second postconviction counsel to overcome the procedural bars to his
claim, but his pleadings do not allege in what ways counsel’s performance was ineffective.
Chappell did not show that second postconviction counsel acted unreasonably in omitting these
claims, and thus failed to demonstrate cause and prejudice.
Failure to raise grounds for relief based on evidence of Chappell's traumatic childhood
Chappell argued that penalty phase counsel did not investigate and present evidence of
his traumatic childhood. According to Chappell, counsel should have presented more evidence
about his family history of substance abuse and mental illness. Attempting to overcome the
procedural bars to this claim, Chappell asserted that second postconviction counsel provided
ineffective assistance in omitting it, but his pleadings omitted anything specific about counsels
performance in this regard.
Penalty phase counsel's omission did not prejudice Chappell. The record revealed that
several jurors found several mitigating circumstances that covered the subjects identified in this
claim, and that postconviction counsel pursued a reasonable strategy focused on eliminating the
single aggravating circumstance that, if successful, would have made Chappell ineligible for the
death penalty. Thus, the district court did not err in denying this penalty-phase-counsel claim as
procedurally barred without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
Failure to present expert witnesses
Chappell argued that penalty phase counsel should have presented evidence of his drug
addiction through an addiction expert, the effects of drugs on the brain through a
neuropharmacologist, and his childhood through an expert on trauma. Chappell again failed to
specifically allege how second postconviction counsel performed deficiently in this area.
4

Failure to prepare witnesses
Chappell argued that penalty phase counsel did not adequately prepare witnesses to
testify during the penalty phase retrial. Chappell failed to present valid argument that the State
was able to discredit certain witnesses because penalty phase counsel did not adequately prepare
them to testify, nor did he show prejudice due to failure to adequately prepare those witnesses.
Failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct
Chappell complained about multiple instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct,
claiming that penalty phase counsel should have objected. The record revealed that second
postconviction counsel raised some of the prosecutorial misconduct arguments, but the Court
rejected them. Chappell failed to prove that second postconviction counsel provided ineffective
assistance.
Failure to object during penalty phase retrial
Chappell claimed that penalty phase counsel should have made various objections during
the penalty phase retrial. The petition indicates that Chappell raised some of these allegations in
his direct appeal after the penalty phase retrial and the Court rejected them. The remaining
allegations are addressed and rejected by the Court.
Failure to challenge jury instructions
Chappell contended that penalty phase counsel did not object to erroneous jury
instructions and that second postconviction counsel provided ineffective assistance by omitting
related penalty-phase-counsel claims. He again made no specific allegation about counsel’s
performance. The trial court correctly instructed the jury in the penalty phase retrial.
Failure to challenge the death penalty
Chappell raised numerous challenges to Nevada's death penalty scheme and his death
sentence. That the penalty is applied in an arbitrary and capricious way, and the total time on
death row renders the sentence unconstitutional. By not raising these claims on appeal from the
judgment entered after the penalty phase retrial, Chappell waived these claims and must
demonstrate good cause and actual prejudice to assert them. Chappell’s pleadings and appellate
arguments were deficient in demonstrating good cause and prejudice.
Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
Chappell claimed appellate counsel who represented him did not effectively argue claims
he raised elsewhere in the third petition. The allegations about counsel’s performance are once
again vague and fail to sufficiently assert that second postconviction counsel unreasonably
omitted the appellate-counsel claims.
Cumulative error as good cause
Chappell argued that in order to take into account their cumulative effect alongside the
claims presented in the third petition, the district court should have considered several claims
5

that he raised in his prior appeals and petitions. The claims raised in the prior proceedings were
rejected on the merits and thus, this argument fails.
Actual innocence
Chappell contends that even if he has not demonstrated cause and prejudice, he can
overcome the procedural bars based on actual innocence. This requires Chappell to “make a
colorable showing that he is actually innocent of the crime or is ineligible for the death
penalty.”10 Chappell claimed he is innocent of burglary, robbery, and murder, but did not identify
any new evidence instead choosing to focus on inconsistencies of the evidence presented at trial.
Statutory laches
Under NRS 34.800, Chappell's petition was also subject to dismissal. The statute states
that a petition may be dismissed if the delay in filing the petition prejudices the State in either
responding to the petition or retrying the petitioner. The State pleaded laches under NRS 34.800,
and the district court found that Chappell had not rebutted the presumption of prejudice. The
majority of the claims asserted by Chappell in the third petition are based on grounds which
Chappell had knowledge of long before he filed the third petition.
Conclusion:
Various mandatory procedural bars foreclosed Chappell's petition, and he repeatedly
failed to show good cause and prejudice to overcome those bars. Chappell’s untimely claims
about first postconviction counsel’s performance, and the alleged ineffective assistance of second
postconviction counsel could not constitute good cause, and Chappell failed to show actual
prejudice. The ineffective assistance claims lack merit, and thus the Court affirmed the district
court’s order dismissing the petition.
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